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1. Introduction
While land deals are on the rise on all continents, the majority in both its
number and hectarage takes place in Africa. Given the (neo)colonial resonance and
local enclosure effects of the sometimes brutal business deals, it is unsurprising that
the debate on foreign direct investment is particularly resonant where Africa is
concerned, from academia to the popular press. The debate however is partial and
dominated by the discussion of the pros and cons of its developmental merits, the fate
of local land users driven or enticed off the land, and of the economic and the
environmental costs.
Snapped up for, in places, as little as fifty cents per hectare, African land is not
necessarily brought into immediate food, forestry and mining production, and when it
is, staples and biofuels dominate rather than export crops (The Economist, 2009).
Speculative hoarding, with a view to bringing the land into production when grain
and other staples commodities markets are at their most profitable or selling the cheaply
acquired land off again at enormous profit at a propitious future moment. Given the
millions of hectares now acquired, these circumstances could easily lead to a future
glut in the global land and commodities market.
If production or speculation is not necessarily the most significant, nor the only,
driver for the new scramble for African land, what is? The present contribution will
see land grab, along with the virtual energy and virtual water that come with the
land, as a phase in an ongoing geopolitical game for influence. Moreover, the present
article considers the circumstances and options of two regionally hegemonic powers,
Egypt and South Africa, claiming land and virtual water - or claiming it back.
1 Slightly adapted version of an eponymous article in M. Keulertz, S. Sojamao, J.A. Allan and J. Warner (Eds).
Handbook of land and water grab in Africa. Routledge. 2012. Reprinted with the kind permission of Routledge.
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The explosion of land deals reverses a centuries-long trend for states to rely on
the world market for a strategic element of their food security. Importing food, and as
a result, importing ‘virtual water’ was an escape for water-scarce economies, preventing
the depletion of their resources, but also creating dependency on exporters of virtual
water. Direct investment not only provides access to resources, but also to geopolitical
control. After identifying the meaning of geopolitical thought and the ´grab bag´ of
geopolitical schools of thought, different strands geopolitics pertinent to African
resource grab, are added as an additional layer of the geopolitics of state building.
Since the term ‘land grab’, as global food giant Nestlé admitted (quoted in The
Economist 2009), is almost tantamount to virtual water grab, we then introduce and
elaborate on the geopolitical turn in Hoekstra’s conception of the ‘geopolitics of (virtual)
water’. Hoekstra’s (2011) and Hoekstra and Chapagain’s (2008)‘s observations identify
security dependencies between virtual-water exporters and importers, but have so far
refrained from deepening the understanding of the geopolitics they refer to.
To illustrate the role of semi-peripheral geopolitics in Africa, the two cases of
Egyptian and South African land and water geopolitics will be presented to illustrate
the importance of geopolitical security concerns legitimising claims on land – and, in
both cases, on claiming it back. In each case, land and water deals have largely gone
under the radar of activist NGOs and scholars. But in both cases, as we shall see, the
topic has its particular sensitivities.
2. Strands in the geopolitics debate: a grab bag of theories
The discipline of geopolitics is, as Mamadouh (1998) has termed it, one flag
with many meanings. Geopolitics re-establishes the importance of variables often
neglected in International Relations (Criekmans 2008). A geopolitician does not start
evaluating the security of a nation from a vacuum, but makes a geospatial analysis of
the home nation’s place and competitive advantages and disadvantageous, threats
and opportunities in a wider international environment.
Next to ‘geopolitics’, the core concept of this tradition is ‘geostrategy’. It is
concerned with the strategic value of geographical factors (resources, access to the
sea, etc.). While Luttwak (1990) has claimed geopolitics has been overtaken by geo-
economics after the Cold War ended, others have pronounced the arrival of a ‘new
geopolitics’. Roberts et al (2003) for example posited a liberal geopolitics, with the free
market as panacea, integration in globalisation.
Klare (2003) for example claims the ‘old geopolitics’ died out as acceptable
discourse after Hitler’s abuse of the Lebensraum doctrine. Yet, he argues, geopolitical
drivers for control of resources remained, which explained why the US supported
apartheid. He posits the competition for the ‘new heartland’ of the Eurasian continent,
‘encompassing the Persian Gulf area, which possesses two-thirds of the world’s oil, the
Caspian Sea basin, which has a large chunk of what’s left, and the surrounding countries
of Central Asia’. Still others claim that Africa is at the heart of the ‘new International
relations’ (African Geopolitics Issue 38. African-geopolitics.com). Lester Brown, a neo-
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Malthusian eco-pessimist, presents a resource-centered view of the ‘new geopolitics’.
Brown (2009) perceives food as the hidden driver for current global geopolitics, and
asserts that the competition for water is actually taking place in the world grain market.
The neo-Marxian world-systems tradition, with Immanuel Wallerstein as its
exponent since the 1970s, sees land grab as neo-colonial competition between imperialist
powers extracting resources for their reproduction. This school roughly identifies four
stages: Imperialism (15th-19th century, primitive accumulation), Capitalist Colonialism
(19th-early 20th century). Developmentalism (Cold War era), and globalisation (post-
Cold War), of which many see the current ‘land grab’ as Primitive Accumulation 2.0.
World-systems approaches help us understand global relations as economic exploitation,
whether of people or resources. World-systems analysts identify a hierarchically ordered
(and multi-level) global core, semi-periphery and periphery groupings. The system’s
economic core extracts resources from the periphery, often aided by a venal ’comprador
bourgeoisie’ in the periphery, selling out natural resources to foreign investors for private
gain. The possible overtaking of the US as a world hegemonic state by China would
not change the logic of this exploitation (although see Agnew 2010).
However since the beginning of this century, it is not as clear to identify as it
used to who belongs to which of the three categories. While the US has remained
hegemonic, the West has been experiencing an overall decline vis-à-vis Asia and the
BRICS economies. The European Union continued to integrate, but could not get its
foreign-policy act together lacking a unified strategy. The resurgence of periphery
(Mayo and Yeros 2005) has also brought a very different power balance in the scramble
for African resources.
While the dependencia approach has largely been superseded by International
Political Economy, the view that Southern elites largely follow the interest of ‘core’
ideas and interests has remained influential. This extends to green ideas on space and
nature conservation, drawing on political ecology, the study of “ecological distribution
conflicts” (Guha and Martínez-Allier, 1997: 31). Thus, ‘the Centre-Periphery division
does not only involve the monetary exchange of goods, it also involves physical exchange
in which Southern regions provide materials and energy so that the North can maintain
and develop its socioeconomic metabolism.’ (Martinez-Allier, 2006). This ´green world
systems´ approach sees the international agricultural trade system as abstracting water
resources as raw materials from “peripheral” countries to “core” countries (ibid.),
The virtual-water perspective discussed here presents globalization via a water-
resources security leans: ‘what’s important from a geopolitical point of view: Europe’s
water security strongly depends on external water resources (Hoekstra, 2011): The
external resource dependence of virtual water ‘importers’ would seem to allow virtual
water ‘exporters’ potentially to impose their political objectives on the ‘importer’.
This contribution is informed by an International Political Economy approach,
but with lashings of neorealism and critical geopolitics. The Marxist concept of ‘surplus’
and ‘excess’, found in world-systems theory, is not presented as a reality in this article,
but as a legitimising discourse for seizing resources. In that sense we borrow from the
tradition of critical geography, ownership of land and water is usually the consequence
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of taking (seizing) land by force, then legitimising the claim, while squatting is taking
it back (Wallerstein 2012), Grounds for grabbing land by the state as ‘eminent domain’
are war, natural disaster or terra nullius, that is, the land appears to belong to no one as
a result of insubstantial claim to title. Labelling land and labour as underdeveloped,
uncivilised, un(der)cultivated, underpopulated and unowned is common practice:
for five centuries securitising moves (invoking security needs to justify intervention
have legitimised enclosure. Even Gulf States now refer to Africa’s ‘underpopulation’
as an imperative for their investment (Geisler 2012).
Problematic about both geopolitics and political geography are their provenance
as essentially Western, Anglo-saxon disciplines that tend to ignore the periphery. The
state-centredness of the European state model has become the norm, which makes
the neoclassical approach less suitable for Africa, where the state is often weak,
dysfunctional, or absent. As a legacy of colonialism, boundaries are irrational,
environmental stress prevails and access to wealth and power is ethnically differentiated
(Griggs 1996). Africa has a surfeit of failed or failing states including Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Somalia and Sudan, which would make a Realist, state-centred approach
seem inappropriate. From a critical geopolitics perspective, it may be doubted that the
state is the key actor on the geopolitical scene. A better approach might involve
focusing on global capitalist elites instead. They straddle the public and private sectors.
We feel a degree of state-centricity in the approach however is defensible given that
the investors involved in continental land grab are often parastatals and recipients
use investment to strengthen their position.
Most analyses being conducted on the big investors from the Western world or
Asia, including the Gulf.  We however are especially interested in the African
geopolitics of the semi-periphery of the world system. The core cannot reach the
periphery without the services rendered by the industrialising semi-periphery. The
semi-periphery can be a sub-imperialist itself, but also tends to be a source of systemic
innovation (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997). Wallerstein (1997) included Egypt and
South Africa, on which we focus in this chapter, among the 35 states of the semiperiphery.
It is shown that a new arrangement for mutual virtual-water dependency is taking
shape.
3. The domestic layer
In this analytical undertaking we go beyond the state-centric perspective
dominating the virtual-water literature and opt for a two-level analysis, as also proposed
by Vieira (2011). There are empirical reasons to see land and virtual-water grab as a
multi-level and multi-sided game. We need to add a second level, the domestic level,
which influences and is influenced by the interstate level. While large-scale foreign
land acquisitions grab the headlines, smaller but more numerous domestic land grabs
by states and by companies facilitated by the state actually predominate.
While geopolitical analysis tends to be concerned with interstate relations,
Cowen and Smith (2009) show that geopolitics ´was never only about the state’s
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external relations, but rather (…) involved a more encompassing “geopolitical social”
that both crosses and crafts the distinction between inside and outside national state
borders’. As in Africa, the dominance of the state sector over its population and
sovereignty over its territorial boundaries are not assured, states continue to be involved
in a domestic hegemonic strategy of state formation at the same time as they seek
external stability in its foreign relations. There are therefore not only external,
international actors, but also regional and domestic actors at play: land-hungry urban
real-estate developers have their eye on the countryside. We should therefore not just
focus on the international chessboard but also on the national arena. Their concerns
are not always coordinated with the state (although they often are).
Mosley (2012) argues private direct investment is a way for states to secure
revenue from peripheral areas. It is also a stage in the ongoing process of state formation.
As Mosley notes, the centralised enclosure of land, in frontier or border areas, is a way
for states to reach into the backwoods, tie them to the state and develop a tax base. In
the Horn of Africa, efforts to escape central rule is a key conflict dynamic. ‘Rents
generated from enclaves let governments by-pass their populations, and militate against
the construction of tax or social contracts; a key source of state accountability’ (Carmody
and Owusu 2007). This process highlights the active role of states, however weakly
developed, in courting foreign direct investment.
At the same time, the potential for riots, or even civil war sparked by farmers
driven off the land can have geopolitical impact. Some directly attribute the civil
wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan to foreign land acquisitions. Perhaps more
precisely, as David Deng has it, the investment complicated an already fractious,
conflict-prone context (cited in Zweynert 2012). These activities investment also imply
a role for the investor in the state formation process. Consider for example, the yet-
incompletely formed “new” South Africa. Its agricultural land investment in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter, DRC), is being driven by the confluence of
an invitation from the DRC mainly to white South African farmers under the auspices
of AgriSA (see South African case study below) and their very focussed goal to seek
opportunities beyond South Africa’s borders.
While much literature suggests land grabbing is a form of neo-colonialism,
investee states are not passive victims, but active marketeers who may eye sources as
a way to strengthen the state’s domestic position. Much land investment responds to
an open invitation from recipient countries, enabled by liberal local investment
legislation, and legitimised as strengthening recipient economies, as it gives access to
power networks and capital without need to address the very challenging tasks and
avoid some risks. These challenges include, firstly, unpredictable experiments with
developing a tax base and accountability, and, secondly, the risk of contracting the
‘Dutch disease’ – spending the windfall proceeds from natural wealth unproductively
(see the discussion on rentier states in Luciani/Beblawi 1989) or the resource curse -
failure to benefit from natural wealth - coupled with a ´governance curse´ (Sparks
2011).
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4. Virtual water grab
The discussions related to land deals are followed on their heels by the discussion
over water access (Woodhouse and Ganho, 2011). Land production will take place in
places where water is available. Adding to such an argument is the concept of virtual
water which brings our attention to how much water is necessary to produce food and,
consequently, how much water a country can save through food imports (Allan, 2011).
The virtual water concept allows us to understand water through virtual flows. The
idea also adds to the understanding that production choices and strategies have a
direct impact over water availability in different parts of the world. When we discuss
a land deal, therefore, we cannot avoid relating the discussion to the allocation of
water resources and the consequences of such allocative choices on the sustainable
availability of water resources. Food exporter and importer countries are also trading
virtual water and consequently importer countries depend on the water resource
endowments of exporters.
The virtual-water perspective presents globalization in a water-resources focus:
‘what’s important from a geopolitical point of view: Europe’s water security strongly
depends on external water resources’ (Hoekstra 2011). The external resource
dependence of water importers would seem to allow exporters to impose their political
objectives on the importer.
In the neoclassical outlook, as Aldaya et al (2010) suggest, countries should
follow the highest economical return to water in their sourcing choice of water-intensive
products, which would reinforce even more the dependency of European countries on
food community imports (Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2008). Food-commodity exporters
would potentially define the rules and assume positions of control and power in the
evolving geopolitical structures. Yet it is food-commodity importers in the global North
who still control the global trade and economy as well as the international institutions
they dominate which shape global politics. Biro (2007) emphasises the dependency of
dry Southern countries on virtual water imports from the temperate North (US and
Europe). Power clearly is not related to who has the resources but rather to who has
the power to secure access to them.
The idea that virtual water is a geopolitical resource was first publicly mooted
in a well-attended session, Water and Geopolitics, during the 2003 World Water Forum
in Kyoto, Japan. At the time, the call was explicitly tied to a trade-promotion agenda
believed to lead to the ecological benefits of market-induced water efficiencies (‘green
liberalism’).  Five years later, Hoekstra and Chapagain (2008, p. 135) noted with
apparent disappointment that ´the idea that freshwater is a geopolitical resource of
global importance... does not get across to many people.´
These scholars had clearly become more aware of the dark side of the global
political economy of global virtual water trade (Allan 2011: 80). In their perspective,
water is a geopolitical resource influencing the strategies of countries in order to
guarantee access to water resources (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008). Such a concept
introduces a new type of water dependency: virtual-water import dependency in which
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water-scarce nations are dependent on food and embedded water supply from other
countries.
By that time, the global setting had changed dramatically as a consequence of
global food price rises. Whole speculative investor funds discovered the food markets
as a relatively secure alternative to the plummeting housing market, states and
Transnational Companies (TNCs) decided to circumvent to foibles of the global
agricultural market and invest directly in productive land and resources, predominantly
in Africa.
It is instructive to observe examples of a positive relation between countries
practicing land grabbing and those dependent on virtual-water import such as Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Libya, Jordan and Kuwait (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Hoekstra
and Chapagain, 2008). The African land deals made by China and India, even though
they are not virtual-water dependent countries today, can also be counted as such for
the future - given an expected increase in food consumption, and the expected
(although by no means certain) persistence of high world food-price levels, they can
be considered part of this category.
Hoekstra and Chapagain’s observations seem to reflect this changed reality. For
Hoekstra, virtual-water supplying countries could assume geopolitical power positions
since other countries would depend on them to guarantee their food and water security.
Through land deals, though, virtual-water-dependent countries are attempting to
assume positions of control since they have access to land and water without the need
to depend on food exporter nations via international food trade. Water, then, is an
important geopolitical resource, but we cannot assume that countries holding large
amounts of land and water will necessarily be in a position of power on the international
geopolitical scene.
Such dynamics are also taking place in the context of energy strategies and in
new alternative sources such as biodiesel. Countries heavily dependent on oil such as
the US, UK and China are also investing in land grab practices to guarantee access to
those resources. In this context, water and virtual water are important aspects of the
new energy strategies in which water is crucial to energy production. In this complex
suit of dependencies, abundance of land and water in a country’s territory does not
assure power on the global geopolitics. On the other hand, these arrangements do
show how the political economy plays a very significant role. The flows of virtual water
will continue through global food commodity trade, and could increase once biofuels
assume a larger importance as an energy source; however what will change are the
mechanisms promoting such flow. Trade will continue to be a strong component but
production resulting from land grabbing agreements will also play a role. In this case,
power relationships in between economies exporting and importing food commodities
and biofuels will not be the only ones in place. TNCs, investor and bilateral land
agreements will also play an important role.
Virtual-water importing countries besides having access to food by trade and
via land grabbing do not need to deal with the social and environmental externalities
of natural resource degradation and water and labour exploitation in their own territory.
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From this perspective importing countries can invest in different economic activities.
For example they can protect their local water and decrease the pressure over the
natural environment. Once more, countries that focus on food production and are
food and virtual water exporters bear the negative outcomes of such production.
The traditional global hegemons in the northern hemisphere have upped the
ante in response to the 2008 food price hike. The US and EU are faced with the
(expected) end of the cheap food era, aging populations, plus a scramble for energy
and rare earths. In the geopolitical contest for Africa, they now compete with very
water-scarce, capital-rich Gulf states, South Korea, Japan and the BRICS economies.
There is a marked difference in the strategies pursued by the investors from different
types of economy. On the one hand West European countries, Japan and the USA,
considered one of the main importers of water through food trade, invest in land
grabbing through private sector agreements, which focus on biofuels production. In
this case, Hoekstra’s understanding of how trade could save water is in place, however,
when attention turns to energy, his focus turns to profit and energy security. On the
other hand, Middle East countries, poor in water resources and highly dependent on
food from abroad, are the main oil producers in the world. They focus their strategy on
government to government agreements to produce food staples and decrease their
dependence on trade and low international food prices.
Water-scarce Gulf-state governments inward investment in land and water in
Africa and elsewhere to guarantee their food supply. They tend to focus their production
on the most water intensive agricultural products; wheat, corn and livestock (von
Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007). Private businesses
headquartered in the UK, Germany, Sweden, USA and Japan are mostly investing in
biofuel production to decrease dependency on oil. The only country that finds itself in
both types of investment is China, investing in both food production and biofuel to
secure its supplies of food and energy (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009) although
it should be noted that Africa is not China’s biggest target for investment.
One would expect most of the grabs to take place in those African countries
where water scarcity is not an issue. Sudan and Ethiopia however are countries with
low levels of water availability while receiving large international investments for
staple production (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Chapagain, 2008). It would
appear that countries involved in inward investment in land and water thus are mainly
externalizing their water scarcity problem.
But what of the ´middle powers´ in Africa, the semi-periphery, those that both
send and receive major investments? To explore this issue, two cases are described
below.
5. Land and (virtual-)water deals in two semi-peripheral states
The following examples may serve to briefly illustrate the geopolitical position
of two states with geopolitical interest in land and water: Egypt and South Africa.
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5.1 The case of Toshka: pipe dream on the Nile
Fear of losing access to water explains Egypt’s obsession with control of the Nile:
Egypt depends on the Nile like a diver on oxygen (Schiffler, 1997) and has always
upheld its rights to water, granted by the British and enforced in a treaty with Ethiopia
in 1906 and water deals with Sudan in 1929 and 1959. Egypt is an example of semi-
periphery in land terms, a downstreamer with few alternatives in water terms and a
net importer in food terms. Like South Africa, Egypt both receives and makes land
deals.
The undisputed leader of the Arab world in the 1950s after Nasser’s revolution
and nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, Egypt has lost its pre-eminent position
to Saudi Arabian oil wealth, yet continues to command a dominant position on the
river Nile, to be considered a cornerstone of NATO security policy and a top recipient
of American aid. Its land redistribution of the 1950s procured the state a political base
among smallholders (fellahin) if it did not lead to a major overhaul in tenure (Bush
2004).
To make up for its dependency, Egypt has always relied on virtual water imports,
banking on American aid until the early 21th century and cheap world food until
2007-8. Now that the age of ‘cheap food’ seems over, Egypt’s dependency on virtual
water became painfully clear when Russia shored up exports in 2010 due to large-
scale fires while food prices such as that of wheat doubled. The impact is felt all the
more in recipients as American food donations and sales at below-market prices as
they have tended, and even sought to, shift dietary preferences in recipient countries
towards wheat (Gonzalez 2004).
Egypt’s dependency on external water is 97% (Hoekstra 2008), and on virtual
water 23.55% (El-Sadek 2010). While for Hoekstra and Chapagain, economic logic
would dictate that the water cost in maintain Egypt self-sufficient on water is
unsustainable once much more water is needed to produce food in Egypt than in other
countries, Egypt has sought to maintain its food security and independence through
domestic staple production and even expanding it, at the cost of struggles with upper
Nile countries (Hoekstra and Chapagain 2008). Ethiopia as an upstream state has
historically threatened to take Egypt’s resources, and in turn Egypt has threatened
war should Ethiopia develop its resources autonomously (Kendie, 1999). This has led
to a game of ‘chicken’ on the river Nile, what with Ethiopia creating thousands of
micro dams under Egypt’s radar (Waterbury and Whittington, 1997). Even today Egypt
keeps upholding the right to interdict ´arresting´ Nilotic water by upstream riparians,
and thus develop water resources in ways that could subtract from Egypt’s inflow.
While Egypt is already exceeding the quota agreed under the 1959 Nile
agreement, it is set to claim more under a new Nile agreement, as the New Valley
land development project in the Western desert gets under way.
It was noted above that inward investment in land and water is legitimised by
geopolitical security arguments, whether of threat or of opportunity. The activity is
commonly associated with the idea that there is a need to develop underutilised
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space. While in the 1970s President Sadat saw the desert as open space to be exploited,
enabling ‘candid land grab’, Mubarak saw it as a threat, needing to be controlled
(Wahdan 2011). These two drivers alternate in the history of Egypt’s internal
colonisation of its desert, the Toshka (or New Valley) project, the first stage of a $70
billion scheme in the desert which is hailed as a ‘new civilisation on the Nile’.
The cost of this so-called Toshka Project, a three-stage plan could run up to
USD90 billion. The Toshka agricultural land development project for a ‘new
civilisation on the Nile’ coincided with empty state coffers, revealing the need to
attract foreign investment. The United Arab Emirates’ Sheikh Zayed furnished start-
up money for the project’s main canal, which was subsequently called after him.
Foreign land investors however were thin on the ground; big swathes of land were
only snapped up by Saudi’s Kingdom Agricultural Development Company, with a
view to producing vegetables for exportation to Europe (Fahmy 1997). The investor
is a Saudi prince Talal, known to be the wealthiest in the region, representing a
cash-flush but water-poor country, saw an opportunity to snap up huge swathes of
fertile land (100,000 acres plus a reported 128,000-acre buffer zone granted under
the counter to protect the land, Salem 2010) at a bargain price. It was an open-
ended deal: no need to invest, no state controls.
While nominally pandering to the rural electorate, promising plots to students
and farmers, in fact the emphasis of the Egyptian state’s attention shifted to the urban
population of Cairo. Centrally imported food was sold at heavily subsidised cost or
given away where food stamps, enabled by American food aid. IMF-imposed reforms
took away these subsidies, causing wild price explosions, leading to food riots in the
late 1970s. The gradual abandonment of the countryside and liberalisation of the land
law in the 1990s deprived many farmers of their economic security, forcing elevated
rents on poor families and threatening to return land to owners who lost it in the
1950s. This displacement led to under-reported rural violence and urbanisation.
Moreover, like so many other seemingly ´up-for-grabs´ areas, the area to be
developed is not empty. Nubian activists and human rights activists have disputed the
deal, dismissed it as both land and water theft and refused to be resettled in Toshka.
Non-governmental activists claim 13,000 Nubian families were expelled from Toshka
to free up the land for investment (Elyan 2011). A lawsuit was filed on their behalf
aimed to annul the Saudi Prince’s land deal in October 2010, but a post-revolutionary
meeting between the new government and Nubian protesters in April 2011 proved
the new Egyptian leadership unwilling to overturn Mubarak’s government’s
resettlement plans.
While in part justified as enhancing food self-sufficiency and organic export,
there is also a population management angle here. Egypt´s population boom and
skyrocketing rate of urbanisation has been invoked as a security imperative to greening
the desert, with foreign (Gulf-state) capital. The desert, as a ’new frontier’, would
import millions of Egyptian into an area currently mainly inhabited by Nubians, where
Islamists have a strong political basis and which has been the scene of terrorist attacks.
Moreover, the settlement establishes prior water claims on the Nile, as it requires 5
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million cubic metres of Nilotic water even in dry years, almost a tenth of the total
Egyptian requirement.
From a geopolitical perspective, it may not be incidental that the land project
is bordering on the Hala´ib Triangle, an area where Egyptian army already made an
incursion into in 1994 as part of a long Egyptian-Sudan dispute over territorial claims.
The project moreover provides employment and potential income for the military
sector which is increasingly turning civil, as agricultural entrepreneurs and
construction developers. While opposition press and Members of Parliament asked
critical questions, nothing really happened until the revolution of 2011 when the
new, post-revolutionary Egyptian government claimed the Saudi Prince had
irresponsibly left land idle, whereupon the investor countered that the Egyptian
government had neglected to provide irrigation water (Eddin 2011). The investor
eventually accepted the truncation of his land take (selling back 50,000 of the
original 100,000 acres at the buying price) and redistribution of the remainder among
young farmers and college graduates.
It may not be without meaning that a Saudi investor is thus snubbed. Since the
age of Nasser, Egypt has presented itself as a leader of the Arab world, but since the oil
boom of the 1970s has faced Saudi Arabia move alongside as a contender for Arab
leadership. Not wanting to lose its geopolitical base in Egypt, the Saudi investor gave
in. As Woertz (2013) contends, Saudi investment is not so much inspired by high food
prices, but by the fear of export restrictions.
Egypt itself has meanwhile faced a counterhegemonic change of scene in the
Nile arena by upstream Alleingang (see Matthews et al. 2013). Egypt has long been able
to maintain its claim on Nile leadership, issuing threats to those who might consider
upstream water diversion, but also facilitating and part-funding Nile co-operation in
various initiatives, most recently the Nile Basin Initiative, which in 2006 almost led to
a new integrated Nile agreement. The negotiations smartly widened the frame from a
zero-sum water game to water-for-energy swaps.
Egypt’s hegemonic position on the river Nile however no longer goes unquestioned
now that Nilotic upstreamers, emboldened by heavy foreign investment, have decided
to draw up their own Nile agreement, without Egypt. In this turn of events emotions
can run high: Egyptian leaders implicitly declared the upstream move a casus belli
when Mohammed Allam, Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, reportedly told
the Egyptian Parliament that Egypt “reserves the right to take whatever course it sees
suitable to safeguard its share.” (AFP 2010). The issue returned in June 2013.
The Ethiopian Millennium (Renaissance) Dam, first mooted in the 1860s and
now seriously under way, feeds Egyptian fears of upstream land grabs which may impact
the quantity directly and indirectly on the quantity and quality (return flows) of Nile
water flowing into Egypt. There may however be a great deal of political posturing to
this sabre-rattling, feeding the revival of persistent water-war sensationalism in the
press.
As an alternative to domestic development and upstream strife, however, Egypt
itself has started to buy land and water resources in Sudan and Ethiopia to produce
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food for Egyptians (Keulertz, 2013). Despite the cereal export ban Ethiopia imposed in
2007, top political figures from both Egypt and Saudi Arabia reportedly (based on
WikiLeaks documents) managed to export from those lands while at home, due to the
increase of food prices, the import of staple foods did not guarantee cheap food for
local consumption.
Egypt’s two-level geopolitical chessboard may look something like this:
• Internal state building. People management, Arabizing the Nubian South,
building new ‘civilsation’ with Saudi and Emirates investment;
• IExternal sphere of influence: carrots and sticks on the Nile, smaller investment
in Sudanese and Ethiopian land.
5.2 Land and water geopolitics of South Africa
At the opposite end of the continent we find a country that likes to label itself
as ‘the new South Africa’, to emphasise a clean break with a troubled past. South
Africa’s post-apartheid status has actually given the country a distinct advantage,
which it uses throughout the Continent as a means to expand its economic and political
influence and ensure its security. The 2010 World Cup football games moreover propelled
South Africa to the global stage. Not since the 1994 election of the former President
Mandela, had an event evoked so much continental solidarity and Pan-Africanism.
The event demonstrated that South Africa was not only capable of meeting the
challenge of putting on an event as well as its World Cup predecessors—Germany and
the US—both ‘core’ states in the world system, with global presence, but could do so
successfully.
According to Hugon (2008), South Africa has relations with as many as 43
African countries and controls the economies of countries in southern Africa. South
African FDI for Lesotho and Malawi is 86% and 80%, respectively (accumulated over
1994-2003). In 2005, South Africa represented 25% of the entire African continent’s
GDP and 65% of the sales of the five hundred largest African companies, half of the
railway network, 40% of highway network, and 50% of energy consumption in sub-
Saharan Africa. Additionally, South Africa is a military power, which not only purchases
weapons, but is a top arms seller.
The ‘South-Africanisation’ of Africa has not gone unnoticed by other African
states; especially those concerned with what some have called South African ‘financial
colonialism’ (Goldstein 2003). Goldstein calls attention to the political dimension of
the increased role of foreign investment by South Africa, which sparked political
controversies in Zambia and Tanzania, where it has found expression in political
opposition to not only South Africa, but also the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). Among these countries, Zambia has the more strategic natural
resources, e.g. copper, which is the principal attraction for South Africa. Besides copper
mining, South Africa has flexed its FDI muscle in both Zambia and Tanzania with
hotels, telecom, and supermarket chains.
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The conspicuous surge in African land deals with India and China however has
allowed South Africa’s land and water expansion on the continent without the
attention of NGOs and other observers focussed on land and related (real and virtual)
water grabs. In semi-arid South Africa, water (and energy) is central to the economy
and, reports indicate South Africa’s limited water resources may have a direct impact
upon its future. Gauteng province, South Africa’s industrial and mining base, has the
highest population density, economic power, education level - and water demand.
South Africa is a ‘pivotal’ riparian in ‘pivotal basins’ (Turton and Earle 2005).
The Orange, Limpopo, and Incomati Rivers, all critical to South Africa, are either
near or are facing closure. If it were just about the water, South Africa’s ambitious
desalination programme, part of the 2004 National Water Resource Strategy [NWRS],
may well go a long way to safeguarding its future water security. South Africa, however,
has used its capacity and hegemonic position to project its power beyond its borders
and has a long history of doing so. Apartheid-era South Africa applied its knowledge,
funds and hegemonic position to obtain water beyond its borders, entering into
transboundary water agreements, capturing and controlling water resources beyond
its political boundaries. The country continues to exercise economic, political, and
advisory influence on other states with a view to future access to water for irrigation
and hydropower.
The Cahora Bassa Dam complex in Mozambique exports electricity generated
from the hydropower plants at the dam to South Africa. The Lesotho Highlands Water
Project (LHWP), which exports Lesotho´s water to South Africa. But water is also
important to the energy security of a country, and where almost three quarters of
energy needs are supplied from coal production, and where the energy sector receives
preferential allocation of water resources. South Africa’s direct 1998 intervention in
Lesotho may not have directly been driven by a water imperative (Turton et al. 2004),
but certainly helped to secure the co-operation of a stable and friendly neighbour
willing to continue the water deal. Two other, not yet fully realized investments involve
importing water from the Zambezi and Congo Rivers.
A recent investment in the Democratic Republic of Congo may further illustrate
the water-power nexus. In November 2011, the South African and DR Congo
governments signed an agreement to develop the Grand Inga III Dam. That agreement
secures South Africa the lead in building a 39,000Mw hydro power plant on the Congo
River, which would dwarf that of China’s Three Gorges Dam. Its dam wall would
exceed that of Lesotho’s Katse, currently the highest dam wall on the continent
(Showers 2012). With reliable electricity, the Congolese could stop cutting forest to
meet their energy needs and export electrical power to South Africa and neighbouring
states. A possible stumbling block to its construction however is the project’s USD80
billion (!) price tag. The Congo River, second only to the Amazon by flow, is unique
among the world’s great rivers due to its rapids and waterfalls so close to its mouth.
Among its most pronounced geomorphic features is the Inga Falls. Overall South
Africa will benefit significantly from involvement in the Inga project. With SA-Eskom
in control, the water-scarce continental economic hegemon gains access to hydropower
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and, importantly, land irrigation controls for agricultural production. Apart from Eskom
South African companies interested in DRC include Sasol (a private international
energy and chemicals company initially formed in South Africa in the 1950s) and
PetroSA (South Africa’s national oil company).
In expanding its footprint in the DRC, South Africa prospers geopolitically, and
builds greater opportunities to enhance its political and economic influence both
singularly and regionally in multiple arenas, particularly those of water and energy.
South Africa has contributed peacekeeping troops, millions of rand (South Africa’s
currency, ZAR) and years of diplomacy to trying to bring stability to the eastern DRC.
This involvement was based not only on a felt moral duty to share South Africa’s
peace dividend with Africa—President Zuma and others have stated that it was in
South Africa’s economic interest to stabilise the Great Lakes region (Mail and Guardian
2011).
South Africa’s regional and continental dominance contributing to its successful
ability to ‘grab’ land and water is rooted in the past. The apartheid era has conditioned
the current realignment of power, framed the political discourse and created the
conditions and space for land (and water grabs) regionally and domestically. From the
1950s to the 1980s the South African government forcibly relocated between three
and five million black and other non-white South Africans (Du Plessis 2004). The
1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act was framed to oversee restitution of land ‘taken’
under the apartheid regime. At that time, the ANC determined to redistribute as
much as 30% of white-owned agricultural land would be subject to expropriation by
the state as a means to redress a historical wrong and restore land to its previous
owners. The ability of previous owners to provide evidence for land restitution can be
challenging, though, especially given the weak tenure rights system and challenges
associated with establishing traditional or customary use, a problem not unlike that
faced by those challenging ‘land grabs’ by external investor public and private investors
throughout the continent.
The deadline for filing claims was 31 December 1998. Between 20 and 25%
would involve rural lands (Du Plessis 2004). While it was emphasised that no land
would be taken by force, violence did occur, small farmers in particular were harmed,
many attacked, some killed, and all forced to leave their farms (IRIN 2003). Only
later would farmers appeal the land invasions and obtain some compensation. All
transactions were to be concluded by 2015 (Hall et al. 2003).
Driven both by sticks (concerns about government taking their land) and carrots
(an acute sense of commercial opportunity), several South African farmers have taken
their commercial farming farther afield. Albeit on a smaller scale than non-African
investors, South African farmers have created a history of land acquisition in Zambia,
Mozambique, and Tanzania that has been going on for decades (Cotula et al., 2009).
AgriSA, the South Africa agro-investment agency has many white commercial South
African farmers who face insecurity, potential losses due to land redistribution reform
policies, as well as deregulation of subsidies and marketing boards making their
livelihoods within South Africa less secure. They have been involved in talks on
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investment with 22 countries. The most significant concluded deal negotiated by
AgriSA is with the Republic of Congo (Hall 2011), which itself imports 95% of its food
requirements. The agreement between the Congo government and AgriSA gives South
African commercial farmers an initial 200,000 ha of former state farms, the associated
farmland and places another 10 million hectares of arable land under the control of
AgriSA farmer members (Hall, 2011).
´Domestic land grabbing´ in South Africa however takes multiple forms.
Grabbing ‘white’ land is legitimised in the name of justice remedying the past actions
of the apartheid state, meanwhile remains an explosive and sensitive issue, whether
for white farmers or black radical (largely unemployed) youth being corralled by the
African National Congress’s Youth League. But ‘black’ land was also seized for the
greater good of the 2010 soccer World Cup—a game repressed under apartheid in
light of its popularity with the black population, but in the ‘new South Africa’ a soft-
power spearhead of its prominent status in the global arena. In Johannesburg for
example, the ‘games’ created the political space and governmental financial support
to evict poor residents and relocate others (an estimated 17,000 or more) legitimated
by the imperative of ‘urban renewal’ in newly ‘zoned’ sports-precincts (Bénit-Gbaffou
2009). Attempts to demolish a 99 year old market in Durban (from which over 10,000
informal traders operated) however were met with organized protest (Cottle 2010). A
judgement rendered by the courts prevented a successful internal land grab.
South Africa’s geopolitical project, then, consists of two levels:
• IInternal state building. Internal economic divergence, potential losses due to
land redistribution reform policies failing anti-poverty programme, racial
violence, nationalisation as ‘grabbing’ (but also ‘squatting’).
• IExternal sphere of influence: pan-Africanism, Independence from the West,
conflict resolution, access to resource, ‘soccer diplomacy’.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The article has sought to deepen the understanding of geopolitical strategies in
Africa of semi-peripheral states in the world system, especially on (virtual) water. In so
doing, it has progressed Arjen Hoekstra’s ideas on the geopolitics of water.
Hoekstra has posited that virtual-water strategies create dependencies, but
failed to elaborate. More’s the pity in light of the post-2008 intensification of state-
centred moves to increase geopolitical security. States are rarely only importers or
exporters of virtual water, so that dependencies are rarely one-way. Moreover, states
can be both investors and investees in land deals. On both ends of the African continent,
Egypt and South Africa come to mind.
From the virtual water geopolitics perspective, the dependency of South Africa
as well as Egypt on virtual water imports can be considered low, even though both
states are facing conditions of water scarcity (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2008). While
neoclassical economists would predict a heavier reliance on external trade in order to
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guarantee their water and food security and deal with pressing population issues, both
countries are using the water security argument to maintain their power positions in
their region and control access to water in multiple ways.
The two states are set in predominantly dry areas, which means water is easily
‘securitised’ as a national security issue in both states. While contending investors are
outside the continent, Egypt and South Africa are part of it, and have direct geo-
hydraulic interests that extend well beyond their respective political boundaries. As
semi-peripheral players in the world system, they have the power to resist external
hunger for their resources, although they do not necessarily refuse. They are moreover
states with their own ethnic and economic power differences, between geographically
concentrated communities (Arab North vs. Nubian South of Egypt, the white-
dominated province of Gauteng vs. the rest of South Africa), and a heavy ‘shadow of
the past’ impinging on present-day politics and investments (Sebastian 2008). Water
strategies may therefore also address overpopulation and socio-economic rifts and
tensions.
Governments all over the developing world, but especially in the Middle East
and North Africa, where the Arab riots also toppled Mubarak, seized on the 2008 food
price peak to tighten the reins on trade and emphasis the primacy of food security.
Indeed, food riots in over 30 countries temporarily put food on the security agenda
internationally (though see Burger et al 2010 on the non-securitisation of food).
South African actors seek security and influence through deals with neighbours
and investments in hydropower and land further afield, which give access to virtual
water and energy. Both semi-peripheral countries are thus exercising their economic
and political power to secure access to food and water security through land deals
with other countries while, at the same time, inviting foreign direct investment, Egypt
on its territory, South Africa in its banking sector. Post-revolutionary Egypt has felt
strong enough to rebuff a Saudi investor, while post-Apartheid South Africa feels
justified in rescinding earlier land takes.
Both countries have used a mix of carrots and sticks in seeking sufficient control
of upstream neighbours. Egypt’s and South Africa’s upstream neighbours, Ethiopia or
Lesotho, control their downstream neighbours’ access to water, but geographic
advantage has not ensured upstreamers political leverage over other countries without
political power. Instead, the upstreamers have accepted land and water deals (Lesotho
Highlands Project, Egyptian land investment in Ethiopia) that are potentially
disempowering to the (virtual) water-exporting countries.
Land and water take then - and their return – are not merely monetary
transactions but need to be legitimised, and may moreover serve geopolitical,
hegemonic goals which likewise need to find acceptance to be durable. In that sense
we have looked at both the ‘hard’ (material) and ‘soft power’ aspects of resource
claims. Hegemons often present themselves as exceptional, imbued with a mission for
their region (Prys, 2008), As hydro-hegemonic contenders (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006)
Egypt and South Africa have a particular need to legitimise their actions to domestic
and external audiences.
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They have proved successful in this endeavour, with the help of side payments
and, at times, open or veiled threats, in ‘socialising’ secondary powers in their region
to accept their discourse (Ikenberry, 1990). In that sense we have looked at both the
‘hard’ (material) and ‘soft power’ aspects of resource claims.
Egypt, blessed with a 5,000 year hydraulic civilisation and, for a time, a prominent
place in the developing world after nationalising the Suez Canal in defiance of England,
France and Israel, continues to claim its leadership of the Nile basin. Hard pressed for
food security, post-revolutionary Egypt appears to have regenerated its plan to colonise
the desert, presented as a New Civilisation on the Nile. Yet it also uses considerable
muscle to keep domestic and foreign opposition at bay, while as an investee, it has
recently given the richest man in the region, a Saudi Arabian prince, a wrap on the
knuckles.
The Saudi ´land grab´ in Egypt has largely been neglected by international
NGOs (if not international water experts) as it seemed ‘non-incendiary’ except for a
relatively small group of Nubians – the issue is ‘undersecuritised’ (Buzan and Waever
2003) giving the Egyptian state leeway to go ahead with the Toshka project relatively
unnoticed. However while Egypt’s reliance on virtual water and the limits to Egypt’s
water wealth have become less of a taboo, the hydrological and economic folly of
Toshka is far less open to debate.
South Africa meanwhile busily invests (and mediates) under a pan-africanist
discourse. The ‘soccer diplomacy’ of the World Cup confirmed South Africa’s status as
the front guard of African resurgence and righting historic wrongs at home. South
Africa´s land dealings however illustrate the complexity of its history relevant to
strong state roles in land acquisition to meet a political agenda. The country has to
grapple with its own sensitive domestic land issues. While Egypt’s Toshka project may
be considered ‘undersecuritised’, in South Africa land grab is ‘oversecuritised’ (Buzan
and Waever, 2003) by all commentators exactly because of the aforementioned ‘shadow
of the past’: the resonance of history makes anything any current South African action
sensitive, interpreted as it is in light of past actions. The ´elephant in the room´ is an
explosive agenda issue, whether for white farmers and black radical youth – not to
mention outside analysts.
The thorniness of the topic requires a careful contextual consideration of notions
simplified by activist ´land grab´ discourse. Geopolitical rationality, this article has
contended, is part and parcel of this context.
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Abstract: Snapped up for, in places, as little as fifty cents per hectare, African land is
not necessarily brought into immediate food, forestry and mining production, and
when it is, staples and biofuels dominate rather than export crops. Speculative hoarding,
with a view to bringing the land into production when grain and other staples
commodities markets are at their most profitable or selling the cheaply acquired land
off again at enormous profit at a propitious future moment. The present contribution
will see land grab, along with the virtual energy and virtual water that come with the
land, as a phase in an ongoing geopolitical game for influence. Moreover, the present
article considers the circumstances and options of two regionally hegemonic powers,
Egypt and South Africa, claiming land and virtual water - or claiming it back.
Key words: Water grabbing. Land grabbing. Virtual water. South Africa. Egypt.
Resumo: Atualmente, no continente africano, grandes porções de terra são negociadas a
preços que chegam a até 50 centavos de dólar por hectare. Seu caráter especulativo indica que
tais áreas entrarão em produção no momento que o preços dos alimentos estiverem altos ou
serão vendidas quando valorizadas. Neste contexto, este artigo têm por objetivo contribuir no
entendimento de como a atual apropriação de territórios, juntamente com sua energia e água
virtual, representam uma fase do jogo geopolítico contemporâneo. Para isso, este artigo analisa
as circunstancias e opções de dois países Africanos regionalmente hegemônicos, Egito e África
do Sul, e suas estratégias em reivindicar e manter o acesso às suas terras e água virtual frente à
tensões com outros países e investidores. Os dois casos ilustram como a importância das
preocupações em relação a segurança geopolítica destes países legitimam as suas reivindicações
territoriais.
Palavras chave: Apropriação da terra. Apropriação da água. Água virtual. Egito. África do Sul.
Resumen: Tierras por todo el continente Africano están siendo apoderadas por tan poco como
50 centavos de dólar por hectárea. Sin embargo, éstas no se utilizan necesariamente para
producción alimentaria, forestal, o minera, y cuando es el caso, dominan los biocombustibles y
CLAIMING (BACK) THE LAND: THE GEOPOLITICS OF EGYPTIAN AND
SOUTH AFRICAN LAND AND WATER GRABS
JEROEN WARNER, ANTOINETTE SEBASTIAN , VANESSA EMPINOTTI
alimentos de primera necesidad, dejando de lado la exportación de cultivos. Por otra parte,
dichos terrenos también se acaparan especulando con futuros auges de precios de los
commodities o aumentos del precio de la tierra. El presente artículo considera la apropiación de
la tierra, junto con los conceptos de agua virtual y energía virtual, como una nueva etapa en el
juego geopolítico de lucha por la influencia. Además este trabajo abarca las circunstancias y
opciones de dos potencias hegemónicas regionales, Egipto y Sudáfrica, los cuales reclaman el
agua y tierra virtual que les fueron arrebatadas.
Palabras clave: apropiación de agua, apropiación de tierra, agua virtual, Sudáfrica, Egipto
